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ABSTRACT
Despite the potential of Machine learning (ML) to learn the behavior
of malware, detect novel malware samples, and significantly im-
prove information security (InfoSec) we see few, if any, high-impact
ML techniques in deployed systems, notwithstanding multiple re-
ported successes in open literature. We hypothesize that the failure
of ML in making high-impacts in InfoSec are rooted in a disconnect
between the two communities as evidenced by a semantic gap—a
difference in how executables are described (e.g. the data and fea-
tures extracted from the data). Specifically, current datasets and
representations used by ML are not suitable for learning the behav-
iors of an executable and differ significantly from those used by
the InfoSec community. In this paper, we survey existing datasets
used for classifying malware by ML algorithms and the features
that are extracted from the data. We observe that: 1) the current
set of extracted features are primarily syntactic, not behavioral, 2)
datasets generally contain extreme exemplars producing a dataset
in which it is easy to discriminate classes, and 3) the datasets pro-
vide significantly different representations of the data encountered
in real-world systems. For ML to make more of an impact in the
InfoSec community requires a change in the data (including the
features and labels) that is used to bridge the current semantic gap.
As a first step in enabling more behavioral analyses, we label exist-
ing malware datasets with behavioral features using open-source
threat reports associated with malware families. This behavioral
labeling alters the analysis from identifying intent (e.g. good vs bad)
or malware family membership to an analysis of which behaviors
are exhibited by an executable. We offer the annotations with the
hope of inspiring future improvements in the data that will further
bridge the semantic gap between the ML and InfoSec communities.
KEYWORDS
malware detection, supervisedmachine learning, benchmark dataset
1 THE PROMISE OF MACHINE LEARNING
Recently, machine learning (ML) has reached previously unseen
levels of success particularly in deep learning (DL), a class of ML
algorithms that use multiple layers in a neural network. Current
advances in DL have achieved state-of-the-art results in many appli-
cation areas including computer vision [34, 83], medical diagnosis
[24], machine translation [58, 86], and playing games [47, 70]. As
such, ML promises the ability to achieve expert-level performance
making previously unobtainable results possible. For malware de-
tection, ML promises to go beyond signature-based techniques by
learning the behaviors of malware that is capable of detecting pre-
viously unseen malware. Prior success in ML demonstrates the
possibilities and creates a certain amount of hype for similar suc-
cess. The successful application of ML in malware detection stands
poised to reduce manual labor by orders of magnitude, reduce er-
rors, and work at scales and speeds previously unobtainable.
Practical success in ML-based malware detection, however, has
not yet been realized despite reported success in ML and informa-
tion security (InfoSec) open research communities. The discrepancy
between the reported performance by ML papers and practical re-
sults has made many inside the InfoSec community wary of using
ML. The output from the ML algorithm is often disregarded or
manually verified—countering the benefit of using ML. There are
many perils to using ML in detecting malware, including: 1) over-
confidence in the model based on unrealistic reported results when
evaluating the MLmodel, 2) distrust in the black box models leading
to unnecessary work of verifying the output, and 3) vulnerability to
intentional adversarial attacks on a large input space. These caveats
are not singular to detecting malware, but are particularly acute
given the high consequences of misclassifying a malware sample.
We hypothesize that this discrepancy stems from a disconnect
between the ML and InfoSec communities and is observable by a
semantic gap (the difference between two descriptions of an object
[32]) in describing executables. With the end goal of detecting mal-
ware based on its behaviors, we survey the existing literature on
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
01
80
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  4
 M
ay
 20
20
Smith and Johnson, et al.
the current datasets that are used by ML models to classify mal-
ware highlighting this semantic gap. Bridging this gap is especially
important to ML as the culture generally emphasizes demonstrated
performance improvements on benchmark datasets (sometimes
over an increase in knowledge) [71]. The current culture has driven
significant improvements by orders of magnitude but places com-
plete dependence on an appropriate benchmark dataset. Misaligned
datasets result in poor performance in practical scenarios.
In highlighting this semantic gap, we do not imply that previous
work is irrelevant. Rather, due to the current representations used
by ML, we find that most approaches are an efficient method for
learning signatures. These have the same caveats of being easily
by-passed with relatively simple methods while a possessing a
limited ability to extrapolate to unseen malware samples. We put
forth that current datasets are limited in their ability to perform
behavior-based malware detection in two primary ways:
(1) Not being representative of data that will be encountered in
deployed scenarios. A commonly employed approach selects
samples that several signature-based detectors agree upon—
biasing the data to the most obvious examples as defined
by signature-based detectors. It follows that ML algorithms
will learn to replicate signature-based detectors. Addition-
ally, due to legal constraints, obtaining large amounts of
goodware to distribute is challenging.
(2) Feature representation is not behavioral. Sharing live mal-
ware samples is dangerous. Even if live malware is provided,
ML algorithms are not designed to ingest them and some
processing is required. Extracting the proper representa-
tion over a large corpus of executables is challenging and
time-consuming. As a result, simpler features are used and
relevant behavioral information is lost.
We suggest that to improve the adoption of ML-based malware
classification, we first need to bridge this semantic gap by align-
ing the data used by ML algorithms with the goals of the InfoSec
community. As a first step, we provide a method for annotating
behaviors in malware samples using open resources and provide
behavioral annotations for the Microsoft Malware Classification
Challenge dataset [65]. This change in labeling alters the focus from
discriminating malware to identifying the key behaviors. In our
view, properly crafted and labeled datasets for ML promises to iden-
tify behavioral characteristics and move beyond signature-based
detections as ML will optimize behavioral identification.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide a brief overview of ML, caveats for its
success, and a brief overview of program analysis (PA) techniques
used by InfoSec teams to determine the intent of an executable.
2.1 Machine Learning Background
In this paper, we focus on supervisedML that learns by example from
labeled data points. We denote the inputs or features as X (where
X can be represented as a vector and each individual component
can be accessed by subscripts Xi ) and the labels or outputs as Y .
Observed variables are represented in lower-case. Therefore, the ith
observation of X is written as xi which can be a vector or a scalar.
Informally, the goal of supervised ML is, given an input vector Xi ,
predict an output Yˆi that matches the actual label Yi .
We follow notation from Friedman et al. [25] to more formally
describe supervised ML. Suppose that our data was generated from
a statistical model
Y = f (x) + ϵ (1)
where the noise ϵ has E(ϵ) = 0 independent of X . The goal of
an ML algorithm, then, is to find an approximation fˆ (x) to f (x)
that preserves the predictive relationship between X and Y . The
approximation fˆ (X ) is learned from a training set T of N observed
input-output pairs (xi ,yi ), i = 1, . . . ,N .
An ML algorithm can modify the input-output relationship fˆ (xi )
in response to the difference between the prediction fˆ (xi ) and the
observation yi . Each learning algorithm has an associated set of
parameters θ that can be modified to alter fˆ (x). A simple example
is a linear model where f (x) = xT β and θ = β . The values of θ are
found by minimizing a loss function L that measures the “goodness”
of the model fit as a function of θ (L(Y , fθ (X ))). The loss function
can take a number of different forms and has a significant impact on
the results and the optimization of the learning algorithm. ManyML
algorithms are maximum likelihood estimators assuming that the
most likely values for θ are those that provide the largest probability
of the observed values:
θˆ = argmax
θ ∈Θ
N∑
i=1
log Pr (yi |xi ,θ ).
For example, one loss function minimizes the residual sum-of-
squares (RSS) or, another, the cross-entropy (CE) loss when Y is a
vector of K possible classes:
RSS(θ ) =
N∑
i=1
(yi − fθ (xi ))2
CE(θ ) =
N∑
i=1
logpyi ,θ (xi )
where pyi ,θ (xi ) = Pr (Y = Yk |X = x),k = 1, . . . ,K for the condi-
tional probability of each class k given X .
ML algorithms minimize the loss on an observed training set T
(training error), however, the goal is to minimize the error on unob-
served data points (the test or generalization error). The expected
generalization error can be decomposed:
Err (x) = E[(Y − fˆ (x))2]
= (E[ fˆ (x)] − f (x))2 + E[( fˆ (x) − E[ fˆ (x)])2] + σ 2 (2)
which is a sum of the bias, variance, and the irreducible error. The
irreducible error represents the inherent noise in the data (ϵ in
Equation 1)—no matter how good the model is, there will be some
amount of error. The bias is the difference between the average
model prediction and the actual value. High bias refers to models
that focus less on the training data and possibly oversimplifies the
model. High variance models, on the other hand, focus more on
the training data and possibly result in overly complex models.
As the complexity of a model increases, the training error tends
to decrease. The performance on training data is usually not a
good indicator of how the model will generalize or how well it
will perform on new data points. Thus, a trade-off between bias
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and variance is needed to achieve a model that generalizes the
best to test data. There are a number of methods for appropriately
trading off between bias and variance. A commonly used approach
to estimate the generalization error is k-fold cross-validation. In
k-fold cross-validation, T is divided into k partitions and each is
used as a validation set while the model is trained on the remaining
k − 1 partitions. The average performance over the k partitions
is then reported. For more details, see an ML overview such as
Friedman et al. [25].
We emphasize that there is an explicit dependence between the
quality of T and the quality of fˆ (x). In practical situations, ML typ-
ically requires large amounts of effort in gathering, cleaning, and
processing data. An observed data point xi needs to be represented
in a format that an ML model can operate on—most ML algorithms
operate on vector representations. However, many interesting prob-
lems are not easily represented as vectors without throwing away
significant amounts of information. If the representation of the
data does not contain the information required for the question
that is being asked (e.g. is the behavior of this executable benign
or malicious?) then this falls within the irreducible error (σ 2 from
Equation 2) that cannot be overcome.
2.2 Overlooked Caveats of ML Successes
ML has been successfully applied in several different domains. How-
ever, this success is usually built on decades of previous research
and understanding that is lacking in InfoSec. For example, the suc-
cess of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [43] in image and
speech processing builds on decades of research in signal process-
ing and how to properly represent the data. The convolution is
an mathematical operator that expresses the amount of overlap of
one function over another function and can be thought of blend-
ing one function with another. For example, a Gaussian function
can be used as a convolution filter to produce a Gaussian blur in
image processing. The convolutions in CNNs, are a codification
of convolutions where the learned function is based on the data
instead of being explicitly defined. One key reason for the success
of convolutions is their ability to be translationally invariant which
is inherently important in object recognition where an object may
be anywhere in the image. An analogous operator in the binary
executable analysis domain does not yet exist.
Another key aspect of the success of ML in other domains is large
amounts of labeled, real-world relevant datasets. Li revolutionized
the computer vision field and object detection by providing labels
for relevant images [20]. Corresponding datasets do not yet exist
for malware detection. Further, ML models do not always learn the
intended concepts. ML algorithms tend to learn signatures, even
when the semantic data is present. For example, CNNs are biased
towards learning texture rather than shapes and objects as humans
perceive [28, 76] making them susceptible to adversarial attacks.
Adding to these issues, the data in InfoSec applications is sig-
nificantly different from other domains. The data lacks proximity
relationships, continuity, and ordinality that are present in many
other domains and assumed by many ML algorithms. For example,
pixel values of 123 and 122 are close in value and neighboring pixels
would have an assumed proximal relationship. In executables, code
blocks can jump to various locations in the binary and values next
to each other in numerical space can have significantly different
meanings. Further compounding this issue is the fact that in general
the number of malware samples is significantly outnumbered by
the number goodware samples which has been shown to exacerbate
other issues in ML algorithms [78]. The combination of these issues
makes simply applying current ML algorithms efficiently difficult.
2.3 Program Analysis
processes that are used to reason about the behavior of a computer
program. In its base form, PA is ultimately interested in program
optimization and correctness such as compiler optimization. There
are several research threads revolving around PA. We highlight a
subset of areas related to extracting features that could be used as
input to ML algorithms.
2.3.1 Syntax vs Semantics. In PA, a distinction is made between
the syntax and the semantics of a program [33] similar to the syn-
tax and semantics found in natural languages, where the syntax is
often described by a grammar (e.g. nouns, verbs, and proper order-
ing) and the semantics are the meaning behind the sentence(s). For
programs, syntax is concerned with the form of expressions that
are allowed (i.e. the sequences of symbols that are accepted by a
compiler/interpreter). Semantics describe the effect of executing
syntactically correct expressions (behavior). To determine the se-
mantics of a program, a definition of syntax is required, at least at
an abstract level. Identifying syntax is much easier than semantics.
Consequently, syntactic features are commonly used in ML.
In the context of ML-based malware detection, the ability to
detect previously unseen malware and possible zero-day attacks
implies that the ML model is able to move beyond syntactic dis-
crimination (like signature detection) to capture behaviors in the
semantics. As shown in Section 2.1, the performance of an ML
model is dependent on the training data. If the training data is
syntactic then expecting an ML model to learn the semantics is
unreasonable.
2.3.2 Static Analysis Techniques. In static analysis, a program is
analyzed in a non-runtime environment. The analysis is generally
performed on a version of the source code, byte code, or application
binaries. Static analysis is used frequently for optimization such
as dead code elimination and for verification such as identifying
potentially vulnerable code and run-time errors. Generally, static
analysis approximates all possible executions of a program through
abstract interpretation or data-flow analysis.
There are several static analyses techniques that capture seman-
tic information. However, many datasets used for ML favor syn-
tactic features that are easier to capture. Data flow analysis (DFA)
is a frequently used technique that collects information about the
possible states (e.g. how variables are used throughout a program)
at various points in a program [75]. DFA constructs a control flow
graph (CFG) that represents the program. Each node in the CFG
often represents a basic block or a sequence of consecutive instruc-
tions where control can only enter at the beginning of the block and
leaves at the end of the block. Directed edges in the graph represent
jumps between one basic block to another. Kildall’s method is a
common method for performing DFA where an equation for each
node is derived and each equation in the graph is iteratively solved,
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propagating inputs and outputs until the system converges [39]. For
example, in forward flow analysis, the equations are in the form:
outb = transb (inb )
inb = joinp∈predb (outp )
where transb is the transfer function of block b representing how
b affects the state of the program and join combines the exit states
of the predecessors of b as the entry state of b. Once the equations
are solved, the entry and exit states of the basic blocks can be used
to derive certain properties about the program. The CFG is a more
semantic representation of the executable, yet how to represent
the CFG suitable for an ML algorithm without loosing semantic
information is non-trivial.
Abstract interpretation [16, 17] is a theoretical framework to
formalize the approximation of computing abstract semantics. Here
semantics refer to a mathematical characterization of possible be-
havior of a program. Themost precise semantics describe accurately
the actual execution of a program and are called concrete semantics.
Small-step, or structural oriented, semantics [56] describe a pro-
gram in terms of the behaviors of its basic operations. The behavior
of a program is a current state (program point and the environ-
ment) given a starting state and series of operations. For example,
consider the simple code below.
1 : n=0
2 : whi l e n < 500 do
3 : n = n +1 ;
4 : end
5 : e x i t
Analyzing the program would yield:
< 1,n ⇒ Ω >→< 2,n ⇒ 0 >→< 3,n ⇒ 0 >→< 4,n ⇒ 1 >→
< 2,n ⇒ 1 >→< 3,n ⇒ 1 >→< 4,n ⇒ 2 > · · · < 5,n ⇒ 500 >
Operational semantics, such as small-step semantics, combine logi-
cal conclusions about program syntax in order to derive semantic
meaning. Assuming the interpretation of syntax is correct, this also
allows for the construction of proofs about program behavior.
Big-step, or natural, semantics [36], like small-step semantics,
define basic components to describe the semantics of a program.
Rather than using the basic operations like small-step, big-step
analytics defines the semantics of functions. Both small and big-
step semantics aim at the same purpose, but go about it in different
ways. More pertinent to malware classification, both are techniques
that derive semantic meaning from a program and could be looked
to as inspiration for features.
Another key static analysis approach over programs is symbolic
execution. Symbolic execution techniques build a mathematical rep-
resentation of a program based on the input and output of various
subroutines or functional blocks [10, 46]. In this representation, in-
dependent variables represent key input values. Constraint solvers,
for example, can then solve for the variables, identifying what kinds
of inputs are required for a particular output state [35, 66]. From a
vulnerability analysis perspective, this can allow analysts to identify
input that can potentially lead to system failure states, which may
be exploitable. Though powerful, symbolic execution techniques
suffer from state explosion proportional to the size and complexity
of a given program [41].
In addition to the more formal approaches, other static analysis
techniques provide disassembly and intermediate-representation of
the code (going from binary to machine code). These provide some
possible steps in transitioning from syntactic to more semantic
representations. However, care needs to be taken to ensure that the
semantic information is not lost.
2.3.3 Dynamic Analysis Techniques. Dynamic analysis analyzes a
program by executing it and precisely analyzes a single or limited
number of executions of a program. The coverage of dynamic anal-
ysis is dependent on the test inputs, which for malware analysis,
can be variants of the operating environment. Often, a subset of
the interactions with the underlying operating system are analyzed
such as system calls or memory reads/writes. It is often used to
ensure program correctness and finding errors in the code [49]. We
focus on techniques that we see as the most pertinent for ML-based
malware detection.
Most dynamic analysis techniques use instrumentation to insert
code into a program to collect run-time information. The instrumen-
tation will vary based on the type information that is desired and
the type of code that is available (e.g. source code, static binary, and
dynamic binary). While each has its own merits, we discuss briefly
dynamic binary instrumentation as there is no need to recompile
or re-link libraries and it can be attached to running processes and
minimizes an inadvertent modification to malware behavior. Most
tools track function calls including system calls and capture the
input parameters, track application threads, intercept signals, and
instrument a process tree.
The output from dynamic analyses has often been heralded by
ML practitioners as a means of modeling behavior. However, be-
cause of a lack of context and the challenges outlined previously,
the representations that are suitable for ML often lose the semantic
information.
2.4 Behavioral Malware Classification
All software has a specific intent or goal. To achieve these goals,
behaviors have to be executed that align with accomplishing them.
Behavioral-base malware detection evaluates a piece of software by
its intended actions before it actually executes them, thus providing
a natural intersection between the ML and PA communities.
In general, a behavior can be defined as an observable changes
to the state of a system such as registry modification, file interac-
tion and handles, and API calls [48]. Previous work has examined
a bottom-up approach developing signatures for the behavior of
binary code and combining short pieces of code to get a higher
level behavior in human-readable format for malware detection
[7, 26, 45]. Mapping to lower-level behaviors, Bayer et al. [13] create
a profile of malware that models objects such as files and registry
keys and the operations made on them. They then cluster malware
according to its behavioral profile
Given that a behavior can be represented in numerousways a top-
down approach may be more appropriate. One approach examined
network traffic and manually assigned high-level behaviors [22]
such as ‘scanning’, ‘scamming’, ‘downloader’ etc. based on observed
artifacts. This approach and other similar approaches [64, 92] get at
assigning behaviors, yet still remain somewhat brittle as signatures
are assigned to behaviors.
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Figure 1: Simple Example of a Resulting Object-TermMatrix
We propose that mapping malware to their behavior in a com-
prehensive manner can be facilitated with improved labeling and
representation. Such a dataset will enable the mapping of individ-
ual behaviors to sequences of lower-level semantics extracted from
binary files.
3 MOTIVATING CASE STUDIES
To help motivate the disconnect between the ML and InfoSec com-
munities, we walk through a case of using ML to automate identify-
ing malware persistence in registry keys. We highlight the difficulty
in generating an appropriate dataset and extrapolating the results
to real-world scenarios.
Briefly, the Registry is a hierarchical key-value database that
stores configurations, program settings, and user profiles. The value
is capable of storing commands to execute when the system is
loaded and is commonly used for maintaining persistence on the
Windows operating system [15]. In addition to system software,
malware takes advantage of the the Registry to ensure that it is
loaded as needed. As an example, a key can have the format:
\HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\System\...\...\ImagePath
and a value that can take multiple formats such as:
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs
or
C:/Program Files/Java/jre7/bin/jqs.exe -service -config
C:/Program Files/Java/jre7/lib/deploy/jqs/jqs.conf
The examples represent a path to an executable, but the values
are capable of storing many complex data types (e.g., binary data,
scripts, etc.). Thus, even with this relatively simple example, repre-
senting this data in a format suitable for ML is non-trivial.
3.1 Data Collection & Parsing
As with most use cases, collecting data is not challenging, but ob-
taining labels and properly representing the data is. Registry data
was collected from Windows machines across a corporate network
for roughly two years, beginning in October 2012, resulting in ap-
proximately 20 million (host, Registry key, timestamp) tuples, with
roughly 136,000 unique Registry entries. Registry data collected
from executing publicly-available malware in a sandbox environ-
ment produced 200 Registry entries.
The raw Registry data is not suitable for ML algorithms due the
variability of the keys. As there are a finite number of keys, they
are represented as a 1-of-N encoding that indicates which Registry
key is being used. The value portion is more complex and describes
what is being executed and from which directory. Ideally, the value
consists of a path and a file that can be parsed into its relative com-
ponents. However, in some cases one program will launch another
which we want to be able to capture. This situation occurs in the
case of services on the computer, launched using svchost.exe, and
in a variety of other situations, e.g. launching dynamically-linked
library (DLL) files using rundll32, or running Java programs us-
ing the Java virtual machine. For these situations, we developed
a parser that finds the launching program (e.g., svchost) as well
as the program that is being launched. Each launching program
is parsed according to the expected syntax (e.g., svchost should
have a -k flag), and when found, these launching programs consti-
tute another categorical variable. Additionally, different file types
exist which are represented as categorical variables per file type
including any associated options (e.g., command-line flags).
Finally, after performing the aforementioned parsing, the spe-
cific folders in a given path are used as terms in a traditional bag-
of-words model. Figure 1 provides an simplified example of the
resulting representation. The resulting data is high-dimensional
(over 12,000 terms) and extremely sparse with few unique obser-
vations (i.e., the number of unique rows is close to the number of
columns). In order to transform the data into a form more amenable
to analysis, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was performed
on the initial representation to reduce the dimensionality of a given
set of variables (i.e., features) while preserving as much information
about the original space as possible.
As outlined in the process, several assumptions and trade-offs
were made to massage the data into a format suitable for ML includ-
ing discarding information. A trade-off had to be made between
capturing all possible information and the complexity of training
an ML model.
3.2 Experimental Analysis and Bias
Given a format suitable for ML, labels are needed to identify which
Registry keys are associated with malicious or benign activity. Ini-
tially, we considered any key that occurs on a large number of hosts
as benign and those that were modified by the malware as mali-
cious. Experimentation with this setup resulted in a cross-validated
area-under-the-curve (AUC) score of 0.99. Performance this high
should suggest that the ML problem is too simple and thus will
not be practically useful. Upon closer inspection, the malicious
examples came from specific hosts and identifying the malware
labels was a simple process. Further investigation revealed that
Registry keys that occur on a large number of systems tend to be
associated with programs and drivers in the system space (e.g., in
C:\Windows\system32). However, the majority of the malicious
keys are associated with the user and program space. A simple
weak indicator that looks for absence of the keywords “windows”,
“system”, or “program” to determinemaliciousness provides an AUC
of 0.85. Thus, our model inadvertently models system space keys
versus other keys and is not likely to generalize well.
Only labeling keys modified by malware as malicious and all
others as benign results in an AUC of 0.96 for ML and an AUC of
0.53 for the weak indicator—not significantly better than random.
This result is promising as the gap between ML and a simple in-
dicator increased significantly. However, this correction is likely
still optimistic. Cross-validation tends to be optimistic in general,
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due to the fact the errors are not independent. Also, this data is
not likely to contain all possible examples of malware that uses
legitimate software Registry for persistence. However, creating a
generalizing principle beyond a signature is challenging. Another
confounding factor is that malware can execute behavior that is
not malicious. Malware authors execute benign software to avoid
detection, and, thus, make it difficult to derive ground-truth labels.
3.3 Other Examples
This paper is not the first to recognize the gap between the research
and actual deployments. Sommer and Paxson [79] point out the
discrepancies in network intrusion detection. They observe that
the task of intrusion detection is fundamentally different from
other applications, making it more challenging. They identify six
key challenges: 1) ML is better for finding similarities rather than
differences, 2) very high cost of classification errors, 3) a semantic
gap between detection results and their operational interpretation,
4) enormous variability in what is “normal”, 5) difficulties in sound
evaluation of the results, and 6) operating in an adversarial setting.
In the context of detecting malware, other work noted discrepancies
particularly with respect to the precision of malware—indicating a
large jump in false negatives when deployed in real-world settings
stemming from the difference in the proportion of malware and the
difficulty on modeling “normal” in executables [77].
4 CURRENT DATASETS
The quality of a learned ML model is largely dependent on the
quality of the training data (Section 2.1) including how represen-
tative the dataset is of real-world scenarios, the alignment of the
information conveyed in the features with domain-relevant ques-
tions, and the amount of mislabeled examples or noisy features.
PA techniques are available that extract several different types of
features, yet prior work has mostly used syntactic features which
are easy to extract. In this section, we briefly discuss the importance
of benchmark datasets historically in ML research, discuss the chal-
lenges in curating a benchmark dataset for malware, and review
the current set of datasets. Despite several attempts, a benchmark
dataset for malware classification has yet to be widely adopted and
have a high impact for ML-based malware classification.
4.1 The Utility of Benchmark Datasets
The progress of any research field depends on reproducible com-
parisons between methods to quantify progress on a given task.
For ML, benchmark datasets facilitate comparisons between learn-
ing algorithms. In addition, benchmark datasets drive ML success
and guide research in several application areas such as object de-
tection [21], facial recognition [55], handwriting recognition [44],
recommender systems [31], and question and answer systems [61].
As obtaining data for ML problems is difficult for various reasons,
benchmark datasets provide a valuable asset that allows research
to be conducted that would not be possible without them. As such,
perhaps more than any other domain, a quality dataset is the key
for ML success.
A benchmark dataset dictates several important characteristics
of the research that use the benchmark dataset. First, it determines
which features are possible based on how the data is represented.
Second, it determines the impact of ML models developed using
the data. If the dataset misrepresents the real-world settings, the
ML model will perform poorly despite performing well on the
benchmark dataset. Thus, great care needs to be exercised when
developing a benchmark dataset. Curating a benchmark dataset is
easier for certain domains than for others and creating a benchmark
dataset for malware is more challenging than others as discussed
in the next section.
4.2 Challenges in Curating a Malware Dataset
4.2.1 Dynamic Environment. Malware classification is a dynamic
problem in which the target is constantly changing and evolving.
In ML parlance, this is concept drift where the distribution of the
target changes over time from what was used for training [27]. In
cases with concept drift, performance often degrades and has been
shown to be significant in malware detection [38]. In addition to
being highly dynamic, malware authors intentionally alter malware
to avoid detection using several obfuscation techniques including
polymorphic code and garbage code insertion. In many other do-
mains, the attempt to deceive is not as prevalent. One danger is that
once a dataset is established, malware authors can purposefully
alter their malware to subvert an ML model trained on that dataset,
rendering it obsolete.
4.2.2 Releasing Data. Many InfoSec companies hold their collec-
tion of malware samples as proprietary. As mentioned above, mal-
ware authors could also use this information to thwart existing
architectures or solutions built on this data—further risking their
clients’ systems. Another consideration is that each collection ser-
vice may be biased to certain demographics, location, network
infrastructure, political ties, etc. that may attract certain types of
attacks. Thus, care should be taken when considering the general
applicability of a released dataset.
4.2.3 Feature Representation. Distributing live malware samples
is a security risk, especially for users who are not accustomed to
handling malware. As a result, most recent datasets first extract pre-
determined features from a set of malware examples and distribute
a dataset of the extracted features. Many ML papers on detecting
malware claim that ML models can go beyond just using signatures
and recognizing behaviors. However, if the features are not capable
of identifying behaviors, it is unrealistic to expect ML models to
detect behavior. As we survey below, many features are syntactic
and lose the behavioral meaning.
4.2.4 Obtaining Labels. Obtaining labels for executables is chal-
lenging because malware samples do not broadcast they are mal-
ware. Many of the current datasts use tools like VirusTotal [4],
which provide the output from multiple antivirus tools, to create
labels. As there is gray area where the antivirus tools disagree,
often only samples that are identified as malware by a majority
of the tools are labeled as malware and others are discarded. This
provides a biased sample that uses the most obvious examples and
is no longer representative of the data that will encountered in
real world deployments. Using the most obvious examples creates
easily separable training data and overly optimistic performance
expectations as the data does not represent the real-world scenario.
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In conjunction with the feature representation, if the labels are poor
so will be the resulting ML model.
4.3 Review of Datasets
There are currently several repositories for ML-based malware
detection that either identify malware families or discriminate mal-
ware from goodware. Table 1 summarizes several available datasets
used for ML.
4.3.1 LiveMalware Repositories. There are several repositories con-
taining live malware, which pose a threat to inadvertently infecting
one’s own computer or network as well as providing malicious
software to adversaries. On the other hand, the malware samples
provide a valuable resource enabling malware analysis and research.
For example, VX (Virus eXchange) heaven [5], with the mantra:
"Viruses don’t harm, ignorance does!" seeks to provide information
about computer viruses including articles, source code, malware
samples, and books to help educate whomever is interested. There
are several similar repositories such as theZoo (a.k.a. the malware
DB) [2] and Virus Share [3] for free or Virus Total [4] which is
available for a fee and also contains benign samples.
This is the ideal situation where a researcher has access to the
raw data. Despite having access to the entire malware sample, as
discussed previously getting the samples into a format suitable
for ML is challenging. Thus, simple features are often extracted
such as metadata from the PE header, imported DLLs, and byte
counts (more details on extracted features are given in Section 5).
These simple features resulted in high detection rates (98.8%) [87].
Thus, from the ML perspective, there is little reward to working
with live malware samples. With live malware repositories, studies
are difficult to compare as each select different subsets of malware
samples to analyze and there is no common base publication to trace
attribution. However, the amount of malware samples is impressive.
On Virus Share, there over 34 million samples as of this writing.
4.3.2 MalImg. The MalImg dataset [50] was motivated by the suc-
cess of deep learning (DL) in image processing and represents
malware samples as gray-scale images. The paper is more about
a technique, but the dataset used in the study was released and
subsequently used in other studies. In MalImg, binary values from
an executable are converted to 8 bit unsigned integers, organized
into a 2-dimensional array and visualized as a gray-scale image in
the range [0, 255] where 0 is black and 255 is white. Examples of
malware represented as images are shown in Figure 2. The benefit
of this approach is that separate static or dynamic analysis is not
required.
The authors observe malware that belongs to the same family
are visually similar in layout and texture when visualized as an
image. In their preliminary analysis, the authors extract texture fea-
tures from the generated gray-scale images using GIST [85] which
extracts frequency and orientation components from an image. On
a dataset with 9,458 malware samples from 25 different families,
they get 97.18% accuracy and 99.2% when variants of a malware
family are combined with a simple 3-nearest neighbor classifier1.
Follow up work is better able to discriminate between the family
variants achieving accuracy of 98.52% when using a convolutional
1A classifier that predicts the majority class of the 3-closest examples
a b
Figure 2: Examples ofmalware represented as gray-scale im-
ages from a) Fakerean and b) Dontovo.A malware families.
neural network [37] and 99.80% with principal component analysis
and a support vector machine [29].
From an ML perspective, achieving such high classification ac-
curacy is somewhat concerning as there is fear that the model has
either overfit the problem or the problem is easily separable. Practi-
cally, this means that the model will have high generalization error
when deployed. Thus, the dataset might not represent real world
conditions well and give unrealistic performance expectations.
4.3.3 MS Malware Classification. The Microsoft Malware Classi-
fication Challenge [65] was developed as a Kaggle competition to
classify malware samples into one of nine malware families. It was
released in 2015 and has since been used in several studies, being
cited more than 70 times at the time of this writing.
The hexadecimal representation of the binary content without
the PE header as well as meta-information (function calls, op codes,
strings, etc.) from the IDA disassembler is provided for each mal-
ware sample. The raw hexadecimal representation allows a user to
extract static features that are desired rather than be limited to what
is provided. Current reported performance on the dataset claims
99.70% [29] and 99.97% accuracy [37] using image-based features.
4.3.4 EMBER. The Endgame Malware BEnchmark for Research
(EMBER) dataset [11] is a collection of extracted features from
1.1 million executables divided into 900k training and 200k test
samples and has emerged as one of the most popular datasets.
EMBER provides features that are consistent with previous work,
but what sets EMBER apart from others is the amount of samples.
One of the key benefits of a benchmark dataset is that it enables
other researchers who may not be able to gather the data to conduct
research in the field.
EMBER has been used in several studies, a few of which we high-
light in Tables 2 and 3. In the original paper, the authors achieved a
98.2% detection rate with a 1% false positive rate. This was further
improved to almost perfect detection achieving a 99.4% detection
rate and an AUC value of 0.9997 [54] as shown in Table 2. These
results highlight the “easiness” of the dataset. Further highlighting
this problem, Vinayakumar et al. [57] modify a DL technique aimed
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Table 1: Summary of malware datasets used for ML
Dataset Year Cite Representations # Samples Labels Labeling Max Acc
Highly Cited
VX Heaven [5] 2010 ? Live executables Varies Varies Curated N/A1
VirusShare [3] 2011 > 300 Live executables Varies Varies Curated N/A1
MalImg [50] 2011 417 Gray-scale images 9,458 25 families MSSE 99.80%
MS Malware Classification [65] 2015 76 Disassembly and hexadecimal 10,868 9 Families MSSE 99.97%
EMBER [11] 2017 46 Parsed and histogram counts 1,100,000 Good, Bad, ? VirusTotal 99.90%
MalRec [73] 2018 11 System calls, memory contents2 66,301 1,270 families VirusTotal3 N/A1
Less Cited
Malware Training Sets [63] 2016 2 Counts from analysis reports 4764 4 families Curated -
Mal-API-2019 [14] 2019 1 System call traces 7,107 8 families VirusTotal -
Meraz’18 Kaggle [6] 2018 ~1 Parsed features 88,347 Good v Bad Curated 91.40%4
1 There is no established dataset making comparisons between studies difficult.
2 Also provides full system replays of malware execution, however the authors note non-trivial efforts to get them to work on other systems.
3 Uses AVClass [72] which leverages VirusTotal.
4 Report accuracy on the Kaggle challenge leader board.
Table 2: Reported false alarm rate, detection rate, and area
under the ROC on the EMBER dataset [54].
False alarm Detection rate Area under
Model rate (FPR) (TPR) ROC (AUC)
0.10% 92.20% 0.9982MalConv [11] 1.00% 97.30%
Gradient-based 0.10% 92.99% 0.9991Decision Tree [11] 1.00% 98.20%
0.10% 97.57% 0.9997Pham et al. [54] 1.00% 99.39%
Table 3: Reported accuracy, precision, recall and F1-score on
the EMBER dataset [57].
Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1
MalConv [59] 98.8% 99.7 97.9 98.8
GBDT [11] 97.5% 99.0 96.2 97.1
KNN 95.1% 95.5 94.6 95.1
DT 96.9% 97.1 96.7 96.9
RF 97.0% 98.6 95.3 96.9
SVM 96.1% 96.4 95.7 96.1
DNN 98.9% 99.7 98.1 98.9
Modified MalConv [57] 99.9% 99.7 100.0 99.9
at malware detection (MalConv [59]) and achieve nearly perfect
accuracy and precision (Table 3).
With results this impressive, there is a tendency to suspect either
that model has overfit and will not generalize to test data or that the
data is too easy. The authors of EMBER point out that the classes
were easy to correctly classify and have attempted to make the task
more challenging [68] in addition to a number of improvements
[67]. The baseline on the updated data is 86.8%. Unfortunately, there
are few results on the updated dataset.
4.3.5 Malrec. Contrary to the other datasets, Malrec provides
system-wide traces of malware executions that can be replayed.
It is intended to address the danger of releasing live malware and
the limited amount of data that can be collected when running in
a sandbox. The replays capture the state of a system that is exe-
cuting malware and thus captures the behaviors of malware while
not releasing actual malware and provides the ability to retrospec-
tively extract features that were not considered relevant when the
malware was first executed. There are currently 66,301 malware
recordings collected over a two year period. The major downside is
the very large size of the data (currently 1.3TB) and the complexity
in getting everything set up can be quite challenging versus simply
having a dataset that is ready to use.
The authors extracted several datasets from the system-wide
recordings including bag-of-word counts for textual data in mem-
ory, network activity, system call traces, and counts of data in-
struction mnemonics. The authors examined a use case in which
they extracted features to use for ML. They created a word list
of all words between 4 and 20 characters long from the English
Wikipedia—resulting 4.4 million terms. They then monitored mem-
ory reads and writes looking for byte sequences that matched words
in their list. Further, terms were removed that appeared in a baseline
of running goodware as well as frequent terms that appeared in
more than 50% of the samples and rare terms that appeared in less
than 0.1% of the samples. This process resulted in ~460,000 terms.
Finally, Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF)
scores were used rather than raw counts. The dimensionality was
further reduced to 2048 input features using PCA. A deep neural
network trained on this data achieved a median F1-score of 97.2%
across all of the malware families.
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Despite having system-wide information, having a PCA version
of the TF-IDF of the text frommemory reads were sufficient for their
dataset to achieve high accuracy. While this is positive, it seems to
go against common wisdom in InfoSec and presents somewhat of
a paradox in the claims of ML and what is observed in deployed
systems. Analyzing the memory contents in a bag-of-words fashion
loses context, and we argue, that it is akin to learning a signature.
We conclude that the ML model is able to quickly learn an effective
signature-based malware detection system.
4.3.6 Other Datasets. As shown in Table 1, there are a handful
of other datasets that have been created, often by other security
companies and hobbyists [6, 14, 63]. These datasets have not been
widely adopted nor is it apparent how much maintenance they
receive. We include them here for completeness, but they do not
provide any feature representations that are not included in the
already discussed datasets. We point out that the Mal-API-2019 [14]
is attractive because system calls, if the context is preserved, should
provide more semantic features. However, system call traces for a
large number of malware is provided by MalRec.
5 ANALYSIS OF DATASETS AND FEATURES
Given that there are several datasets with different feature represen-
tations, we examine which features contribute to the performance
of an ML model across the datasets. We find that 1) the features are
overwhelmingly syntactic and very few attempt to extract seman-
tic features and are careful to maintain semantic information, and
that 2) the most useful features vary across datasets. These results
help confirm that the ML models operate more like signature-based
malware detection mechanisms and are not able to pull out salient
behavioral information. The inconsistency in feature importances
suggests that the ML model learned some nuances rather than the
semantics. Hence, the ML models should not be expected to de-
tect novel forms of malware based on their behavior as there is a
semantic gap between the data and the task.
Raman [62] examined which features are the most discrimina-
tive between malware samples from VX Heaven and software that
comes installed by default on Windows operating systems. They
were able to achieve a true positive rate of 98.6% with a false pos-
itive rate of 5.7% by only extracting seven features from the files.
Despite the impressive performance, the selected features are eas-
ily manipulable and may be better suited toward discriminating
between Microsoft programs and non-Microsoft programs:
(1) The size of the debug-directory. Microsoft-related executa-
bles have a debug directory while others may not.
(2) The version of the file. This is user defined. Microsoft re-
lated executables generally had a larger version while most
malware had a image version of zero.
(3) The relative-virtual address of the import address table. The
value of this feature is 4096 for most clean files and 0 or a
very large value for malware.
(4) The size of the export table. The size is generally non-zero
for clean files and zero for malware.
(5) The size of the resource section. Many malware samples
have no resources while Microsoft files often do.
(6) The size of the second section in the executable. In the
dataset, several malware samples only had one section.
(7) The number of sections. This relates to the previous feature
and the authors are not able to make any clear connections
between malware and goodware.
It is clear that the features do not capture the behavior of the
malware yet obtain high classification accuracy. Despite the high
performance, the model could easily be defeated by an adversary by
including a debug directory or setting the version of the software
to be greater than zero. As the dataset does not represent the real-
world problemwell, it affects the robustness of an MLmodel trained
on that data. A high false negative rate would be expected with a
larger set of goodware that will be encountered in deployed settings.
Ahmadi et al. [8] extracted a large number of features that are
commonly used in ML models from the hexadecimal representation
and disassembled files from the Microsoft Malware Classification
Challenge dataset with the intent of identifying features that are
the most discriminative. The examined features include:
(1) byte counts (BYTE).
(2) the size of the hexadecimal representation and the address
of the first byte sequence (MD1).
(3) byte entropy (ENT).
(4) image representation using Haralick features (IMG1) and
Local Binary Patterns (IMG2).
(5) histogram of the length of strings extracted from the hexa-
decimal file (STR).
(6) the size of, number of line in the disassembled file (MD2).
(7) the frequency of a set of symbols in the disassembled file (-,
+, *, ], [, ?, @) (SYM).
(8) the frequency of the occurrence of a subset of 93 of possible
operation codes in the disassembled file (OPC).
(9) the frequency of the use of registers (REG).
(10) the frequency of the use of the top 794 Window API calls
from a previous analysis of malware (API).
(11) characteristics of the sections in the binary (SEC).
(12) statistics around using db, dw, and dd instructions which are
used for setting byte, word, and double word and are used
to obfuscate API calls (DP).
(13) the frequency of 95 manually chosen keywords from the
disassembled code (MISC)
Table 4 shows the classification accuracy on the training set
and from using 5-fold cross-validation for each subset of extracted
features using gradient boosted decision trees. There are several
feature groups that achieve over 99% accuracy including MISC
which simply counts the number of times a hand-selected keyword
appears. None of the features preserve behaviors and most capture
syntax. The system calls get at the behavior, but there is no context.
Surprisingly, MD1 and MD2 (i.e. file size) achieve about 85% and
76% accuracy respectively (random is 11.11%). This highlights a
concern that there are features which may be discriminative but are
easily manipulated. Thus these features can be used adversarially
and do not represent the underlying behavior that is desired to be
modeled.
Oyama et al. [51] examine which features have the largest impact
on the EMBER dataset. EMBER contains several feature groups:
(1) General file information from the PE header such as virtual
size of the file, thread local storage, resources, as well as the
file size and number of symbols.
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Table 4: The accuracy on the training set and using 5-fold
cross-validation on the Microsoft Malware Classification
Challenge dataset [8].
Train 5-CV
Feature # Features Accuracy Accuracy
Hexadecimal file
ENT 203 99.87% 98.62%
BYTE 256 99.48% 98.08%
STR 116 98.77% 97.35%
IMG1 52 97.18% 95.50%
IMG2 108 97.36% 95.10%
MD1 2 85.47% 85.25%
Disassembled file
MISC 95 99.84% 99.17%
OPC 93 99.73% 99.07%
SEC 25 99.48% 98.99%
REG 26 99.32% 98.33%
DP 24 99.05% 98.11%
API 796 99.05% 98.43%
SYM 8 98.15% 96.84%
MD2 2 76.55% 75.62%
(2) Header information from the COFF header providing the
timestamp, the target machine, linker versions, and major
and minor image versions.
(3) Import functions obtained by parsing the address table.
(4) Exported functions.
(5) Section information including the name, size, entropy virtual
size and list of strings representing section characteristics.
(6) Byte histogram representing the counts of each byte value.
(7) Byte-entropy histogram approximating the joint distribution
of entropy and a given byte value.
(8) String information providing simple statistics about print-
able strings that are at least five characters long. This feature
also specifically provides information on strings that begin
with “C:\", “http://", “https://" or “HKEY_".
Table 5 shows the accuracy for each feature group. The imports,
which also have the largest number of features, has the highest
accuracy as 77.8%. Oyama et al. also report that header, imports,
section, and histogram feature groups (together) provide accuracy
up to about 90% accuracy. The remaining 2.7% comes from the
other feature groups. As with the Microsoft Malware Classification
Challenge, none of the features include behavioral information.
Other work makes similar observations on various datasets:
• the PE headers are the most discriminative [91]
• onVXHeaven PE-Miner [74] achieves a detection rate greater
than 99% only using structural information (PE and section
header information), DLLs and object files as features.
Further, other work noted that the count features (histograms) used
in previous work has promoted overfitting and, in the combination
with the labels, produced overly optimistic results [60]. This further
indicates a change is needed in how the data for ML is represented.
Table 5: Reported accuracy and number of features for each
feature set in the EMBER dataset [51].
Feature set Number of features Accuracy
imports 1280 77.8
section 255 68.2
histogram 256 68.1
byte entropy 256 61.8
strings 104 61.4
general 10 56.0
header 62 52.9
exports 128 17.2
All 2,351 92.7
6 ADVERSARIAL ML
Malware detection is an inherently adversarial domain where at-
tackers constantly try to thwart defenses and defenders try to stay
one step ahead of attackers. We briefly address work in adversarial
ML. Adversarial ML is a broad field which we don’t aim to fully
cover in this section but highlight existing approaches to evading
ML malware detectors. Some papers have demonstrated moderate
success in evading ML classifiers by only changing one pixel, in an
image, or one byte, in a malware binary [80, 82]. Many papers in
the general space assume a neural network architecture which per-
mits specific attack vectors on those models [84]. However, Kucuk
and Yan [40] demonstrate attacks on a variety of different feature
representations that do not rely on a neural network architecture or
full knowledge of the classifier. For any proposed attack, a defense
can be constructed but the potential attack surface is vast. A robust
solution to unseen attacks is particularly challenging in this domain
and most defenses often come at the expense of accuracy [88].
Evaluating existing feature representations highlights some of
the general ambiguity within malware classification. Prior work at-
tacked two different feature representations (byte code frequencies
and system call frequencies) [40]. Both of these representations, or
similar variations, are common in many ML malware classification
papers and are used in the reviewed work. Image representations
of malware can be seen as a more sophisticated version of the byte
code frequencies. However, the frequency of individual components
doesn’t determine the overall behavior of software. For evading
standard signature methods, malware authors insert junk code that
isn’t anticipated to run or null operators that cause no change of
state. Similarly, insertion of superfluous code yields effective obscu-
ration of malware to many malware machine learning classifiers
[19, 52]. Al-Dujaili et al. [9] demonstrate that neural networks can
learn the junk code to insert to evade ML-based detectors. Grosse
et al. [30] effectively evade detection by an ML-based detector
more than 63% of the time but make the observation that they use
static features as perturbing dynamic features is significantly more
challenging. Further, other prior work [18] showed that when pre-
sented as an image, ML did not learn anything meaningful from the
text and data sections but learned discriminating features from the
header. Thus, detection could be evaded by simply modifying the
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syntactic features. Part of the susceptibility to adversarial attacks
arises from not capturing behavioral information.
7 BEHAVIORAL-BASED DATASETS
ML models offer the ability to detect novel malware based on their
behaviors. As we have shown, most benchmark datasets do not
contain behavioral information or it is lost when extracting features.
As a first step to modeling behaviors, we provide labels for the
behavior expressed in malware so the ML model can search for
behavioral artifacts. Extracting behavioral information from an
executable is a challenging problem that is a current research area
for PA. We do not claim to solve it here, but offer a process using
threat reports corresponding to malware families.
We propose that behaviors consist of a) a high-level description
of the intent and b) low-level “primitives” that accomplish the re-
spective behavior. A primitive is a sequence of steps that must occur
for the behavior to be successful. These primitives will vary by rep-
resentation and malware family/toolkit and may involve multiple
systems (e.g., network and host). Additionally, the sequence will
be ordered or partially ordered (i.e., one step depends on the previ-
ous step(s)). It is possible that primitives may contain conditional
statements that are represented better by a directed graph than a
sequence. Thus, the feature representation is non-trivial.
Further complicating the issue, multiple primitives may exist
that accomplish the same behavior. For example, persistence is a
common behavior for malware as it allows the attacker to maintain
a foothold on the machine or network. To achieve persistence an
attacker could copy the malware to the startup folder or modify the
Registry to execute it whenever the machine reboots.
To label the behaviors, we leverage theMITREMalware Behavior
Catalog (MBC) [1]. MBC was designed to support malware analysis
while mapping into the MITRE ATT&CK® knowledge base [81].
ATT&CK documents common tactics, techniques, and procedures
that advanced persistent threats use against Windows enterprise
networks. The behaviors are organized according to the objective
of the malware such as “Anti-Behavioral Analysis,” “Command and
Control,” or “Persistence.” Each objective contains behaviors and
code characteristics (techniques) that support that objective. For
“Persistence” some of the techniques include Application Shimming,
DLL Search Order Hijacking, and Scheduled Task. Each technique has
an explanation for what it covers and some can belong to multiple
objectives—the “Scheduled Task” technique could be under the
“Execution,” “Persistence,” or “Privilege Escalation” objective.
We label the behaviors of a malware family using corresponding
open-source threat reports. The information in the threat reports is
then mapped to the “objectives” and “techniques” outlined by MBC.
In some cases, a judgment has to made about which category is the
most appropriate. To help correct for errors, we label each family
multiple times and used a peer-review style to come to conclusions.
The behavioral labels for each family are then extrapolated to indi-
vidual examples. The current process is human intensive, subjective,
and errors can be made based on variations of a malware family. De-
spite these limitations, the behavioral labeling helps align the data
to the desired task of identifying novel malware samples through
its behaviors. The labels would allow an ML model to directly learn
the behaviors that may be not be discernible using only family
information. Future work could include the use of natural language
processing tools to help automate the process. Additionally, as new
malware is analyzed, behaviors could be mapped into the MBC
directly bypassing the need for this method.
We label the Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge dataset
which includes seven malware families, (Ramnit , Lollipop, Kelihos ,
Vundo, Simda, Tracur , Gatak).2 We document the source and a
short definition of the behavior to help develop a repeatable process.
The result of this process is a hierarchical behavioral labeling of
each malware family as shown in Table 6. The compiled version
is accessible at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12240980. The
hierarchical structure captures both the high-level objective and
employed technique(s) to meet that objective. By providing this
labeling, an ML model will learn features that are associated with
behaviors across all included malware families. The hope is that
by adjusting the objective of the ML algorithms, better features
and models can be developed that will improve the deployment of
ML-base malware detectors.
We are not the first to suggest the addition of behavioral labels,
however our process provides richer behavioral annotation. Se-
mantic Malware Attribute Relevance Tagging (SMART) [23] uses
the output from anti-virus suites and parses keywords from the
output to provide additional information. For example, the output
could be Win32.Virlock.Gen.8 or TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen and the
key words are extracted Virlock, and Crypt and ZPACK respec-
tively. This provides information that the malware is respectively
ransomware and packed. The keywords align with the objectives in
our process but do not provide consistent information on how the
behavior is implemented, which our method provides. The high-
level additional informationwas shown to improve the performance
of an ML model [69]. We anticipate similar improved results as well
as adjustments in follow-on studies to focus on behaviors.
8 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Applying machine learning techniques to new areas often requires
creatively reformulating problems. For example, DL techniques
are typically better suited to solving statistical problems than per-
forming calculations and working with symbolic data. However, by
leveraging language models to translate symbolic math problems
into suitable formats, DL techniques were used to solve symbolic
mathematics problems—outperforming commercial computer al-
gebra systems such as Mathematica or MATLAB [42]. Other non-
traditional ML applications seek to generate floor plans from point
clouds captured inside of buildings. By reformulating the problem to
predict the center of each room andwall for every point in the cloud,
the problem aligns well with existing neural network approaches
and allows for interpretable debugging during development [53].
We have shown that current feature extraction and ML tech-
niques optimized for signal processing are inadequate for malware
detection. Future work will require closer collaboration between
executable analysis professionals and ML practitioners. We will
need to capture more features such as basic blocks, control flow
graphs, etc., that are indicative of behavior and represented such
2Kelihos versions 1 and 3 were combined because the threat reports did not dis-
tinguish between versions and we dropped Obfuscator.ACY as it was a bucket for
obfuscated malware for which the family could not be determined.
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Table 6: Malware Behavior Label Example for Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge
Objective: Collection Credential Access Defense Evasion . . .
Technique: Local Man in the Steal Web Credential in Credentials Indicator ProcessSystem Browser Hooking Session Web Browser in Files Masquerading Removal Injection . . .
Gatak x - x - - - x - x . . .
Ramnit x x x x x - - - x . . .
Lollipop x - - - - - - - - . . .
Kelihos x - - - - - - - - . . .
Vundo x - - - - x x - x . . .
Simda x - - - - - x - - . . .
Tracur - - - - - - - - - . . .
that behavioral information is not lost. Additionally, improved data
will be required that is more representative of the data in deployed
scenarios including software that falls in the gray area between
obvious malware and goodware.
As new ML and DL methods are developed, some may have
more applicability outside of simply classifying malware. Attention
[12, 89] was introduced as a method to help a DL method focus on
the most pertinent portions of the input. In the InfoSec community,
often a piece of software needs to be reverse engineered to some
extent to understand the behavior of the software. Attention allows
for an ML model to learn which portions of an executable are the
most pertinent to resulting classification [90]. Augmented with the
behavioral annotations, attention would also indicate which por-
tions of an executable are the most pertinent to that behavior. This
would result in significant decreases in analyst time and potentially
lead to improved program understanding.
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we reviewed the body of research on providing
datasets to train ML models for the classification of malware. De-
spite the successful demonstration of classifying malware by ML
models on a number of datasets in academic research, we find that
little ML is used in actual deployments. We believe that this is
due to multiple reasons stemming from a disconnect between the
ML and InfoSec communities resulting in a misalignment of ques-
tions being asked by the communities and how those are answered.
We have shown that this misalignment in the ML domain stems
from a semantic gap in the available data and how that data is
represented. While both communities seek to identify malware,
the InfoSec community uses semantic parsing techniques to try to
understand what the program is doing and, based on the behavior,
a decision can be made to determine if the program is malware
or goodware. The ML community has primarily (inadvertently)
examined syntactic features to determine the intent of a program
to classify malware. For ML to make a larger impact in deployed
settings, we advocate for 1) an increased collaboration between the
two communities, 2) improved data in terms of the features that are
employed (those that capture behavior), the inclusion of samples
that are not clear cut goodware or malware, and the inclusion of
behavioral information—modifying the task of determining intent
to identifying behaviors, and 3) the development of a benchmark
dataset that more closely aligns with problems encountered by the
InfoSec community. Benchmark datasets have a history of driving
and significantly improving ML in a given application area (i.e.
computer vision) and an appropriate one could help drive the ML-
based malware classification. As a first step, we proposed a method
for annotating datasets with behavioral information and provided
behavioral annotations for the Microsoft Microsoft Malware Classi-
fication Challenge dataset.
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